Blogging on 'emotions'


There is probably nothing new in speaking about emotions. It is happening for more than thousands of years and the topic has been addressed by philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and not only. Emotions are part of our day to day life, movies, music, dramas, decision making, problem solving, and what not. I really wonder whether there is anything, any mental process, which could categorically be separated from emotions.
What is relatively new regarding emotions, is the attempt to make sense of them, i.e. of trying to understand how they impel us on doing what we do, of being what we are. This is my journey on trying to approach the 'passions' as Descartes, and others before him, called them, meaning ‘the perceptions, feelings or emotions of the soul which we relate specifically to it, and which are caused, maintained and fortified by some movement of the [animal] spirits’

Philosophical approach to affective states

Discussions related to emotions flooded philosophical speculations of the
ancient, medieval and renaissance time and, to them, in the 17th and 18th century,
the modern mind added new concepts. To the psychologists’ “ordinary”
emotions, theologians, of the Judeo-Christian tradition, likewise, supplied their
“religious emotion-types”, i.e. gratitude, contrition, love of God, piety,
compassion, etc. The terminology expressing emotions changed with the change
of the approach and that of time. Thus, Aristotle’s pathos (i. e. pathos),
important in moral life, changed for the Roman Stoics into “emotion”, as they
adopted Cicero’s translation of the Greek pathos into the Latin perturbatio (i.e.
disturbance) and afterwards it turned out to be affectus (i.e. affect) for Seneca.
Stoics connected emotions to cognition and, throughout several centuries,
debated with the Epicureans on the place of emotions for a good life. Others
preferred passio (i.e. passion), connecting emotions with “suffering” and
“endurance”. Galen, the Greek physician and philosopher, pursued Plato’s
tripartite model of the human mind, i.e. the reasoning, the desiring, and the
emotive parts, and offered a biological and physiological basis of each one. His
theory of the body’s humors intended to explain a person’s dispositions and
temperament, i.e. sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic. Descartes
described emotion as “passion” and meant by that “the perceptions, feelings or
emotions of the soul which we relate specifically to it, and which are caused,
maintained and fortified by some movement of the [animal] spirits”1. There are,
in his opinion, six primitive “passions”, i.e. wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and
sadness, and these could be the ingredients used for a good life. Spinoza’s
emotions, the affections of the soul, are yielded by one reality, encompassing
mind and body, and are responsible for making the difference on the quality of
life by motivating one to act or restrain. Hume challenged the inferior place of
passion in philosophy and disputed the role of reason. For him, emotions were
the very essence of human social and moral life. Hobbes called them also
“passions” and assimilated them to appetites and aversions whereas Kant
considered them as conative phenomena. Twentieth century Anglo-American
philosophy and psychology included emotions in cognitive processes as well and
for that behaviorism was one strong reason.

Dana SUGU & Amita CHATTERJEE (2010). Flashback: Reshuffling Emotions International Journal on Humanistic Ideology, 3 (1), 109-133

Interdisciplinary approach to affective states

Despite its lengthy history in human thought, the nature of emotion is still
elusive. For many centuries, the approach to emotion studies have been
exclusively pursued by philosophers and psychologists, currently, however,
emotion is a topic of different branches of interdisciplinary research. This
widening of interest seems now reasonable given that emotions arise, as Oatley
(1999) noticed, with the meeting of two worlds: nature and culture. Scherer,
Wallbott, & Summerfield (1986) emphasized that emotional experiences happen
in social interactions, hence the analyzing of “pure” emotional expressions in a
nonsocial setting, such as a laboratory, might be questioned. Adolphs (2001)
claim that “the subject matter of emotion is the relation between organism and
environment, the effect that interaction of the two has on organism’s survival
and well-being. Emotions thus pertain to the value that stimuli and situation have
for the organism”.


What elicits an emotional experience? There are several theories
concerning this. Watson (1919) proposed that events themselves induce
emotions, as in stimulus-response theories. Cannon (1929/2003) argued that
psychological processes, patterns of neural activity of the brain, are the causes,
while James (1894) believed that they are evoked by the peripheral autonomic
activity. Tomkins (1962) considered that facial and other expressions induce
emotions, whereas James (1980) thought that behaviors such as attack and flight
stimulate them. Motivational processes, such as hunger, were seen by Tomkins
to bring about emotions, although Parkinson (1997) regarded the desire to
intimidate an opponent as motivational and thus the cause of emotional
reactions. Appraisal theory (Roseman, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-
Laird, 1987; Scherer, 1992; Smith & Lazarus, 1991; Stein & Levine, 1987)
claims that emotions are reactions to evaluation (appraisals) of events and
situations.


In psychological discussions, emotions are generally set apart from
cognition and conation as well as reflexes. However, most contemporary authors
agree that emotions’ behavioral schemata are to be distinguished from other
conceptual areas based on their duration, complexity and their adaptive value.
Accordingly, on basis of their duration, emotions could be seen as short and long
lasting, referring thus to reflex reactions and affects or personality traits,
respectively. From the point view of their complexity, on the one hand, they are
regarded as very simple, primitive and hard-wired behavioral patterns, as in the
case of reflex responses and some basic survival related appetitive behaviors. On
the other hand, they are considered more complex and learned cognitive
activities. From the perspective of their adaptive value, emotions are considered
as phylogenetically advanced adaptive response patterns, based on the integrated
activity of several components and providing high survival value (Gainotti,
2001).


The emotional system can also be conceived as a set of responsive
dispositions, where each one would indicate a particular relation with the
environment. First, there are affect dispositions, producing feelings of pleasure
and pain and corresponding functional attuning. (Cacioppo, Gardner & Bentson,
1997; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Rolls, 1999) Second, there are provisions for
global motivational variations in tonic activity, effort and alertness (Pribram &
McGuinness, 1975), inhibition (Gray, 1990), as well as the attentional arousal
mechanisms, and the autonomic arousal (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Third, there
are specific motivational dispositions that, when activated, produce major
variations in action readiness – dispositions for motivation like “seeking” or
desire, self-protection, confrontation, play, or submission (Panksepp, 1998).
Their activation corresponds to different “basic emotions”. Fourth, there are
dispositions for various individual autonomic reactions – for motor responses
such as facial expressions, voice intonation, postures (Frijda, 2001).
The discrete states and variables of emotions are difficult to analyze in
laboratory, thus, for long, unobservable emotional processes have been
approached through the examination of facial expressions on which the
universality of ‘basic emotions’ is mostly based. Darwin (1965) was very
interested in studying emotions, and analyzed them from an evolutionary
perspective. Approaching people of different cultures, he determined that there is
a set of universal, “basic emotions”, each of which is distinctive in its adaptive
implication and psychological expression. Before Darwin, as he mentions in his
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872/1998), the facial expression
of emotions had been studied by the painter Le Brun who published his
“Conferences” in 1667. “Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression” was published
by the physiologist Sir Charles Bell in 1806. In 1862, G. B. Duchenne published
his “Mecanisme de la Physionomie Humaine”, in which he analyzed the
movements of facial muscles. He permitted Darwin to copy from his works the
photographs he needed to use. Darwin thought that emotions and the way we
express them are products of our animal ancestry. He saw the “basic emotions”
to be biological in nature. Bowler (2005) argues that Darwin’s need to minimize
the gap between humans and animals, to convince his readers of his evolutionary
theory brought him to the study of facial expressions.


Darwin’s book begins and ends stressing on three principles, which rule
the ways animals and humans express their emotions. First, there is the principle
of serviceable associated habits that links some modes of expression to adaptive
behavior, as when fear is expressed by bodily changes designed to prepare for
fight. Second, there is the principle of antithesis emphasizing that emotion can
be expressed by behavior, which is exact opposite of that elicited automatically
by the opposite behavior. A dog exhibits affection for its owner through a
behavior that differs from the one in case of fear and anger. Third, a principle
that links expression to direct action of the nervous system, as when fear elicits
trembling. Throughout his book, Darwin never used the expression “basic
emotions”, instead he begins the second chapter by mentioning “special
expression of man ... [which are] innate or universal, and which alone deserve to
rank as true expressions”. His evidence for them universality comes out of
answers he received to 16 questions. The answers were collected by Englishmen
living or traveling in Africa, America, Australia, Borneo, China, India, Malaysia
and New Zealand.


Tomkins (1962), taking up Darwin’s work after a century of neglect, listed
a series of emotions associated with their respective facial expressions. He
considered these expressions to be inherited and under the control of subcortical
centers in the brain.
Several years later, Ekman (1973) used Darwin’s method of showing six
photographs expressing emotions and asking different people, from 21 countries,
to judge the emotions shown. Ekman studying the autonomic changes associated
with six “basic emotions” (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise)
found that each one of them was associated with specific bodily patterns. Ekman
(1994), influenced by Darwin (1872/1997) and Tomkins (1962), classified the
characteristics of basic emotions, which distinguish them from one another and
other affective phenomena.


Panksepp (1998:33) summarized four possible ways of viewing the role of
affective consciousness in the generation of adaptive behaviours in emotional
situations: (I) the “commonsense” view that emotions cause bodily responses;
(II) the possibility that the emotions and bodily responses are independently but
concurrently organized; (III) the counterintuitive James-Lange type of view that
emotions arise by the way we bodily respond in emotional situations; and (IV) a
more realistic view, which suggests that all levels of information processing in
the generation of emotional responses interact with each other.

Dana SUGU & Amita CHATTERJEE (2010). Flashback: Reshuffling Emotions International Journal on Humanistic Ideology, 3 (1), 109-133

Debates on Emotions I

Primacy debate: appraisal vs. arousal
Zajonc (1980) claimed that simple familiarity with something creates
affective reactions, such as liking or disliking, for that item. Objects were
presented subliminally while participants were engaged in another task. The
results revealed that though the participants showed no recognition of the
subliminal items, they gave them higher preference ratings than novel items.
Zajonc argued that the form of experience that we call feeling accompanies all
cognitions, preceding them and lacking awareness, and concluded that cognition
is not necessary in order to have affective experiences.


Lazarus (1984) argued that cognitive appraisal underlies and is an integral
feature of all emotional states. LeDoux (1989, 1995) has shown that emotions,
especially fear, are recognized by the brain’s two routes, subcortical and cortical,
suggesting that Zajonc’s hypothesis of direct elicitation of emotion without the
need of cognition might be right.


Whether or not “basic”
What is the need of such a distinction? An understanding of certain
affective processes as basic would nevertheless create another category, i.e. that
of non-basic emotions. Alternatively, there could be another case and that would
probably lead to affective states as neither basic nor non-basic, an instigator state
that might be by itself the cause of such states. Why do we need at all to make
divisions between innumerable affective processes one experiences throughout
life, nay, within couple of hours?


We have already stated that the distinction among affective states is
presumed to have started with Darwin’s eagerness to connect human primates
with their non-human evolutionarily related species. Darwin (1872/1998)
considered that emotions could well fill up the explanatory gap between animals
and our humanoid ancestors. “He who admits on general ground that the
structure and habits of all animals have been gradually evolved, will look at the
whole subject of Expressions in a new and interesting light”. In his opinion,
there are six “special expression of man ... [which are] innate or universal and
which alone deserve to rank as true expressions”.


Tomkins (1962/2008), following Darwin identified emotions associating
them with corresponding facial expressions and connected these emotions with
subcortical centres in the brain. Tomkins identified eight primary motivating
mechanisms, the “inborn protocols that when triggered encourage us to spring
into action”2. He divided them into “positive” and “negative” affects
respectively, and a “very brief neutral reset button” that is associated with the
emotion of surprise.

Dana SUGU & Amita CHATTERJEE (2010). Flashback: Reshuffling Emotions International Journal on Humanistic Ideology, 3 (1), 109-133

Debates on Emotions II

Ekman (1994), influenced by Darwin (1872/1997) and his mentor Tomkins
(1962/2008), classified the characteristics of basic emotions, which distinguish
them from one another and other affective phenomena as follows: (1) Distinctive
universal signals (facial expression); (2) Presence in other primates; (3)
Distinctive physiology (such as a specific ANS reaction for each emotion); (4)
Distinctive universal antecedents – there are certain stimuli, preprogrammed
evolutionarily, that will elicit each of these basic emotions. This does not deny
the importance of learning in emotional responsiveness since learning
contributes to the establishment of a connection between a stimulus and an
emotion; (5) Coherence of response system (i.e. coherence between a given
emotion, its facial expression, an ANS pattern and CNS activity; (6) Quick onset
– emotions can begin within milliseconds of the presentation of an emotionally
provoking stimulus; (7) Brief duration – usually in seconds rather than minutes
or hours. This distinguishes emotions from moods; (8) Automatic appraisal
mechanism; (9) Unbidden occurrence – emotional responses occur automatically
to a given stimulus; they happen to us, they are not chosen by us; (10)
Distinctive subjective experience; and (11) Distinctive thoughts, memories
images.


Bechara, Damasio & Damasio (2000), asserted that the brain structures
associated with the emotional states have all been independently associated with
bodily responses. He also refers to drives and motivations, pain and pleasure as
triggers or constituents of emotions but not as emotions in the proper sense. The
same distinction is made by Panksepp (1998) between proper emotions and
drives who does not consider hunger, thirst, and disgust to be emotions. From an
evolutionary point of view, “basic emotions” are “rapid acting, failsafe devices
that produce behavioral, physiological and cognitive responses tailored to certain
critical features of the environment.” (Griffiths, 1997:240)
Emotions of happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, anger, and fear, have
been claimed to be universal in respect of human population. (Ekman, 1994;
Izard, 1995) Ellsworth (1991) argues that these expressions have been theorists’
major “evidence” for holistic emotion programs that could not be broken down
into smaller units. Even though universal prototypical patterns have been found
for these “basic emotions”, there is no evidence that the facial expressions are
the indicators of emotions in spontaneous interactions. There are several
problems in linking facial expressions with emotion-antecedent appraisal. The
main problem is that there is no known mechanism of linking them. Besides, the
dynamically changing emotional expressions are not easily linked to a static
verbal label. In addition, the implicit and explicit social norms impose a
powerful role of regulation and expression control that renders the study of such
expressions rather difficult. Moreover, facial expressions are not necessarily an
indicator of emotional experience since they can serve several different
functions. (Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001)


‘Basic emotions’ are considered as having evolved for their adaptive value
in dealing with fundamental life tasks. Among these tasks, Lazarus (1991)
mentions facing danger, processing towards attaining goals, experiencing
irrevocable loss, “common adaptation tasks as these are appraised and
configured into core relational themes”. Stein & Trabasso (1992) consider that
the main task is the attainment of a goal. Attaining it, happiness is the result;
failure induces sadness; anger results by loosing it, while expectation of failure
leads to fear. For Tooby & Cosmides (1990) the appraisal of a current event is
influenced by our past experiences and are adaptive situations that recurred
innumerable times in our evolutionary history.


Ortony & Turner (1990), Scherer (1992) and Kaiser and Scherer (1998)
criticized the concept of “basic emotions” as fixed biological programs. They
argue that there are classes of appraisals independent of “basic emotions”. In
connection with this, Scherer (1984) suggests that there are a large number of
highly differentiated emotional states, which are not exhausted by assuming the
“basic emotions”. Facial expressions are not seen as “readout” of motor
programs but rather as indicators of mental states and evaluation processes.
Smith and Scott (1997) and Roseman (1984) argue that the link between the
facial and appraisal dimension is based on the relation between facial expression
and basic emotion. Unlike Ekman, they claim that single components of facial
patterns do have a meaning and this meaning can be explained as manifestations
of specific appraisal outcomes.


In spite of the disagreement, authors do agree that raising the eyebrows and
raising the eyelids are associated with appraisal dimensions related to attentional
activity, novelty, and unexpectedness. Moreover, there is consensus that
corrugator activity (frown) encodes not only unpleasantness but more
specifically perceived goal obstacles and the presence of goal discrepancies.
(Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001)


Dana SUGU & Amita CHATTERJEE (2010). Flashback: Reshuffling Emotions International Journal on Humanistic Ideology, 3 (1), 109-133